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1 Introduction
Does the devolution of responsibility for service
provision to elected local authorities improve the
delivery of services to the poor? This is the major
challenge of democratic decentralisation and a key
benchmark by which its effectiveness should be
assessed. Many governments across the developing
world are engaged in ambitious efforts to devolve
power and resources to local bodies which are
increasingly assuming responsibility for managing the
delivery of health, education and other essential
services to poor people. Decentralised service
delivery is now a key determinant of the scope for
less-developed countries to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals since many of these goals are
premised on outcomes that are increasingly within
the realm of responsibility of elected local
governments.
While many adherents of decentralisation value its
potential to increase accountability and participation
at the local level, for poor people the critical litmus
test lies in the scope for decentralisation to deliver
improvements in services and material well-being. 
Improvements in democratic accountability and
better service delivery outcomes are not mutually
exclusive but can have complementary and mutually
reinforcing effects. The problem is that
decentralisation policy initiatives are often premised
on strengthening local democracy without
considering fully the conditions under which service
delivery improvements can be achieved. The
challenge confronting proponents of decentralisation
is that the evidence to support the case for
decentralised service delivery is fragmentary and
inconsistent and the conditions for successful
devolution of services are poorly understood. The
articles in this IDS Bulletin seek to throw light on
these issues by marshalling evidence on service
delivery outcomes from a range of developing
countries that are engaged in a process of
democratic decentralisation and highlighting the
implications for designing reforms that maximise the
prospects for improvements in the quality and access
of services for the poor.
2 Decentralising service delivery: assumptions
and challenges
Most efforts to promote democratic decentralisation
are premised on the assumption that local
governments will be more responsive to the needs of
the citizens and take their preferences into account in
determining the type of services to be provided, the
level of resources required, and the optimal means of
ensuring effective delivery. Such efforts are also
predicated on the expectation that power and
responsibilities will be devolved by benign central
governments to elected local bodies that are
accountable and responsive to their constituents. A
further assumption is that financial resources will be
available to support the provision of services at the
local level through a combination of central
government fiscal transfers and local taxation. Finally,
most decentralisation initiatives assume that local
administrative capacity will be adequate to deliver the
expected increase in the production of local services.
However, as the articles in this IDS Bulletin
demonstrate, these supportive conditions are often
absent in many contexts in which decentralisation is
taking place. For this reason, efforts to improve the
delivery of health, education, drinking water and
local infrastructure through elected local
governments are often destined to fail. The evidence
presented here provides little succour to adherents
of decentralised service delivery by showing there
are very few cases where equity and efficiency
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outcomes have improved as a result of
decentralisation. Evidence of sustained improvement
is very slight and is usually highly context specific,
with improved outcomes resulting from a
combination of locally supportive conditions. The
articles in this IDS Bulletin draw attention to some
improvements in service delivery outcomes in
Colombia and Kerala and in the health sector in parts
of Asia and Africa. But there is little convincing
evidence from these articles and wider experience to
show that education outcomes are improved
through decentralisation. 
In most cases reported from Africa, Asia and Latin
America the quality of public services has either
declined or remained unchanged as a consequence
of democratic decentralisation. The evidence collated
and reviewed in this IDS Bulletin suggests that
decentralised service delivery has not improved poor
people’s access and improvements in quality have not
resulted from a transfer of power and responsibilities
to local authorities. Decentralisation also accentuates
horizontal inequalities between richer and poorer
areas as a consequence of differential levels of
administrative capacity and ability to raise local
resources. From the evidence summarised by
Conyers, with some minor exceptions, the
experience of sub-Saharan Africa is especially
disappointing with little improvement in the quality
of services provided through local governments,
both to poor people and local citizens more
generally, a fact confirmed by negative public
perception of decentralisation in many countries. 
But this dismal evidence should not lead to the
conclusion that decentralisation is inimical to
achieving improvements in services that benefit the
poor. Nor does it necessarily lead to the conclusion
that centralised provision or deconcentration to
arms-length central government agencies can ensure
improved delivery, or that private and non-
governmental providers are better placed to deliver
services to poor people at the local level. Moreover,
efforts to decentralise service provision are often
motivated in the first place by poorly performing
centralised state agencies that are unaccountable and
unresponsive to local people and their elected
representatives in local governments. As Conyers
cautions in her article, the results of decentralisation
are mediated by a number of factors that lie beyond
the control of elected local representatives and
officials, such as the prevailing political context, the
balance of power at the local level, and then lack of
financial resources. Many of the problems with
decentralised service delivery lie in the design and
implementation of reform initiatives and insufficient
attention to the feasibility of achieving major
improvements without commensurate changes in
broader governance structures and underlying
socioeconomic conditions. 
A further difficulty in coming to definitive
conclusions on the potential for decentralisation to
deliver improved outcomes is that the evidence is
weak, partial and inconsistent. This finding emerges
as a clear theme in the contributions by Conyers and
Robinson. The case study evidence and survey data in
this IDS Bulletin adds considerably to the existing
knowledge base and our understanding of the
problems encountered in decentralised service
provision. But the contributors acknowledge that it is
difficult to arrive at hard and fast conclusions in the
absence of comprehensive baseline or control data
on the state of service delivery at the inception of
decentralised service delivery initiatives. The article by
Mohmand and Cheema on the decentralisation
reforms in Pakistan is one of the very few examples
where such data has been collected. In most cases,
the data draws on particular sectors for specific time
periods and with limited geographical coverage
which frustrates the task of generalisation. A related
problem is that the available data does not break
down outcomes by socioeconomic status, gender,
age or ethnicity which obscures the differential
impact of decentralised service delivery on the
quality and access of services. The article by
Shankland and Athias on the decentralisation of
health services to movements representing
indigenous peoples in Brazil is a rare example of one
such study. Finally, it is difficult to disentangle the
differential effects of decentralisation from other
parallel processes such as economic stabilisation and
privatisation which have respectively resulted in fiscal
austerity and reduced state provision of services. As
highlighted by Robinson, for many Latin American
countries in the 1980s, the combination of
decentralisation with structural adjustment and
privatisation proved disastrous in terms of service
delivery outcomes for poorer people and regions.
3 Decentralising service delivery: evidence and
insights
The various contributions in this IDS Bulletin provide
fresh data and review available evidence on the
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impact of decentralised service delivery in local
jurisdictions in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The
articles by Conyers and Robinson respectively offer
broader comparative reviews from Africa and
developing countries as a whole while the other five
articles draw on the experience of individual
countries. The coverage ranges from country-level
reviews in Mexico (Salazar) and Cambodia
(Spyckerelle and Morrison), through to large-scale
survey and comparative case study evidence from
decentralisation in India (Johnson et al.) and Pakistan
(Mohmand and Cheema), and the experience of
indigenous communities in Brazil (Shankland and
Athias). In gathering evidence they draw on original
survey data, case study research and published
secondary materials. The articles cover a range of
service sectors but with a particular focus on health,
education, drinking water and sanitation, as well as
local infrastructure, with considerable variation in the
form and extent of decentralisation and availability of
resources. Most of the empirical material covers the
period of democratic decentralisation from the late
1980s and 1990s, with reference to earlier episodes
of administrative decentralisation under centralised
and authoritarian governments. 
In his contribution to this IDS Bulletin, Robinson surveys
the empirical evidence in the secondary literature on
the impact of decentralisation on service delivery,
drawing on examples and case material from Latin
America, Africa and Asia. He finds that the
comparative evidence on equity and efficiency
outcomes is very limited and uneven in coverage,
rendering the task of generalisation difficult. The
available evidence suggests that the consequences for
equity and efficiency are largely negative, with poorer
people and regions being disadvantaged by
decentralisation reforms or receiving a much lower
share of the resulting benefits of improved service
delivery. Contrary to theoretical expectations, there is
little evidence to suggest that the quality of services
improves with decentralisation, which means that local
preferences do not automatically translate into
improved targeting and delivery. While
decentralisation can contribute to improved
participation and accountability, it is generally not
delivering improved service delivery outcomes. This
does not invalidate the potential of decentralisation to
improve the delivery of quality services to the poor or
to reduce inter-regional disparities. Robinson argues
that a number of supporting conditions are required
to enable decentralisation to deliver on this potential,
which includes political commitment, political
mobilisation of the poor, institutionalised participation
and accountability mechanisms, the availability of
adequate financial resources, and technical and
managerial capacity in local governments.
In her article, Conyers focuses on African experience
of decentralisation and reviews the evidence on
service delivery outcomes available from a variety of
countries and sectors. She also finds that, despite
some isolated examples of success, decentralisation
has not had a significant positive impact on the
quality of public services in the region. However, she
argues that the main reason for poor outcomes
stems from the fundamental characteristics of
contemporary African states than decentralisation as
such. These include the centralisation of power,
weak structures of accountability, and lack of
countervailing pressure from civil society. For these
reasons, African governments have largely been
reluctant to devolve power and finance to local
governments, which consequently lack the capacity
and resources to deliver improved services. Conyers
concludes that the problems of decentralisation
cannot be addressed in isolation from wider
problems of governance prevailing in many African
countries, and therefore have to be addressed as part
of a slow and gradual process of state-building.
Turning to the first of the Asian cases, Johnson et al.
examine the impact that local governance structures
have on the ability of sub-national governments to
implement social policy in two states of India,
Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. They find
significant differences in the functioning of
decentralised local bodies in the two states which
have a bearing on the implementation of credit
delivery programmes for the poor. In Madhya
Pradesh, which had progressed further with
legislation governing the devolution of powers and
responsibilities, the government implemented its
self-employment and microcredit programme
through elected local councils (panchayats). In
contrast, the government of Andhra Pradesh chose
to implement its group savings scheme through self-
help groups formed by poor rural women under the
supervision of officials in local government
administrations. Based on extensive field research in
the two states, the authors find that rates of
satisfaction were much higher among members of
self-help groups in Andhra Pradesh than among
microcredit beneficiaries in Madhya Pradesh, and
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that perceived levels of corruption were much lower
in the former. The authors also report that levels of
participation in village assemblies (gram sabhas) were
much higher in Andhra Pradesh, explained in part by
the incentives generated by the microcredit
programme and the closer spatial proximity between
villagers and local government officials. 
The personal involvement of the elected heads of
local councils (sarpanches) in Madhya Pradesh in
determining eligibility and access to government
schemes was found to give rise to patronage in
beneficiary selection, while in Andhra Pradesh the
heads of elected councils lacked such discretion, with
local government officials primarily responsible for
selection, monitoring and implementation. These
findings demonstrate that devolving power and
responsibility to elected local councils in India may
not produce the improvements in service delivery
anticipated by proponents of democratic
decentralisation without commensurate
improvements in local accountability. Rather, the
authors highlight the value of close interactions
between local self-help groups representing the
collective interests of poor women and line
department officials operating at the local level in
which the scope for graft was minimised by the
design of the programme and the type of benefits
that accrued to the participants in the scheme.
Mohmand and Cheema analyse the extent to which
decentralisation reforms introduced in 2001 have
been effective in improving the magnitude and
provision of health and education services in rural
Pakistan. Survey data from four villages in Faisalabad
district of Punjab province gathered two years after
the introduction of the reforms reveal that while the
provision of targeted sanitation and sewerage
services has increased substantially, the vast majority
of respondents in the sample villages report that the
delivery of universal health and education services
has either remained unchanged or has worsened.
These results are confirmed by a national social audit
that used a baseline survey to track improvements in
service delivery. Utilisation of government health
services has declined dramatically because of
shortages in the availability of medicines and doctors
while those who were able to afford to do so opted
for private health provision on the basis of availability
rather than considerations of quality. Mohmand and
Cheema find a similar pattern with state-provided
primary education, where the majority of
respondents report no improvement in teacher
attendance or in school facilities since the
decentralisation reforms. This is especially marked for
girls’ primary schools where teacher attendance is
worse than for equivalent boys’ schools, but where
alternative options for private schooling are far less
prevalent or accessible. An important consequence
of the reforms is that quality and equity in the local
provision of public services has worsened, and that
smallholders and low caste citizens and their girl
children are especially vulnerable as they cannot
access alternative options. The authors locate these
problems in accountability failures in the design of
the new decentralised system and the consequent
inability of citizens to hold local service providers to
account for the shortcomings in the provision of
universal services.
In the third Asian case considered in this IDS Bulletin,
Spykerelle and Morrison examine the approach taken
in Cambodia to the delivery of small-scale local
infrastructure through newly empowered communes
under the provisions of the 2001 legislative
framework for devolved governance. A central
objective of these reforms was to improve local
infrastructure and access to services, as well as to
promote participation and good governance at the
local level. Based on successful experience with
discretionary funding before the new legislation
came into force, a special Commune Fund was
established to which the communes submit bids for
local infrastructure development in the form of
funding for the construction and repair of roads,
bridges, irrigation works, water and power supply,
markets, schools and health centres, which in turn
could improve the provision of basic services.
Since 2003, one third of Cambodia’s population is
estimated to have benefited from these investments.
While it is too early to determine the effectiveness
of these commune-level investments, Cambodia has
laid the foundations for decentralised service delivery
by establishing district-level planning and
administrative arrangements to oversee local
implementation and has created consultation
mechanisms to ensure that the interests of the poor
are represented in commune development planning
processes. A key obstacle facing the successful
decentralisation of service provision in Cambodia is
the limited financial resources available to the
communes for local infrastructure investments (a
little over US$1 per capita), capacity constraints at the
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commune level, and the limited scope for mobilising
local financing. The remit of communes in local
service provision is also restricted in focus. Health
and education still remain the responsibility of central
line departments and the communes have no direct
role in the implementation of these services under
present legislative provisions. However, Cambodia
has created the legislative and administrative
foundations on the basis of which further devolution
of responsibility for service provision could occur,
provided that commensurate resources and capacity-
building investments are provided by the central
government. 
Coming to the first of two Latin American cases,
Salazar examines the lessons emerging from Mexico’s
experience of decentralisation for the delivery of
essential public services since the late 1990s. There
has been a major shift in responsibility from
centralised government provision to the present-day
situation in which state and municipal governments
are responsible for providing the majority of services
in health, education and social infrastructure. But the
evidence on changes in the delivery of public services
does not point to a positive picture from the
perspective of equity and efficiency. In particular,
there are horizontal imbalances in levels of provision
and service delivery outcomes between the richer
and more disadvantaged parts of the country and
among different sections of the population.
Education achievement has not improved with
decentralisation while significant disparities remain
among social groups in terms of years of schooling.
Considerable inefficiencies arise from unclear
demarcation of responsibilities between state and
federal governments. In the health and education
sectors there are significant disparities in the
availability of resources for service provision between
different states. Increased funds have been made
available to finance social infrastructure in the
municipalities but the evidence suggests that there is
no discernable relationship between the resources
expended and resultant improvements in service
delivery. Salazar identifies two key problems that
contribute to poor service delivery, namely the weak
accountability of public officials responsible for
service delivery and the high degree of fiscal
centralisation, both of which inhibit the scope for
improved outcomes.
The decentralisation of healthcare in Brazil is the
focus of the contribution by Shankland and Athias,
with a particular focus on the role of indigenous
peoples’ movements in the delivery of health
services. Indigenous peoples suffer from much worse
health problems than the average Brazilian citizen,
with higher rates of infant mortality and high rates
of morbidity from infectious diseases. The Brazilian
government’s efforts to decentralise healthcare
provision to municipalities and special indigenous
health districts in the 1990s was designed to tackle
problems of centralisation and exclusion. But despite
improvements in immunisation coverage and other
health indicators, efforts to subcontract the provision
of healthcare services in indigenous health districts
to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), church
groups and indigenous organisations did not prove
successful, with continued high rates of morbidity
among indigenous peoples from preventable
diseases. Shankland and Athias examine the
experience of decentralised healthcare in a region
mainly inhabited by indigenous peoples through a
case study of the Rio Negro region in the far
northwest of the Brazilian Amazon, where an
indigenous peoples’ movement assumed
management responsibility for health services.
However, the movement continued to operate
within the technical parameters of state health
provision, with priorities and resource allocations
largely determined by non-indigenous health
professionals in line with central government
policies. While the efficiency of healthcare provision
improved under indigenous management, it faced a
series of difficulties caused by delayed financial
transfers and was unable to preserve an adequate
level of health services which resulted in problems
with uneven drug supplies and erratic staff
attendance in health centres. Hence, while the
principle of decentralising healthcare delivery to
indigenous management was initially viewed as a
welcome development, it ultimately proved unable
to achieve any significant impact on the nature of
the decentralised service given the constraints
operating in the wider healthcare system.
4 Lessons and implications 
The implications of the various articles in this IDS
Bulletin are of considerable significance for research
and policy. These emanate from a remarkably
consistent set of findings based on the empirical
evidence gathered by the contributors from a range
of countries and sectors. These are as follows: (1) the
consequences of democratic decentralisation in
terms of service delivery outcomes are largely
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negative, (2) poor and marginalised people have not
generally experienced improved access and service
quality under democratic decentralisation; and
(3) improved outcomes are contingent on a
supportive set of conditions and mediating factors,
some of which lie outside the control of elected
local governments. 
These findings raise important implications for
research. The dearth of systematic, robust and
comparative evidence on decentralised service
delivery outcomes is a striking gap in knowledge.
Existing research remains partial, limited and context
specific. Knowledge on what works well, where,
how and why is still fragmentary. The implications of
decentralisation for service delivery in different
sectors in a range of political and socioeconomic
contexts are far from clear. There are fewer areas of
development policy that are more in need of
research than strengthening the evidence base to
measure the impact of policies designed to deliver
services to poor people through elected local
governments.
The most immediate policy implication is an urgent
need to reappraise what democratic decentralisation
can realistically be expected to deliver in terms of
improved service delivery. In some contexts, the
expectations may simply be excessive, and limitations
of resources and administrative capacity mean that
elected governments may not be well placed to take
on the increased responsibilities that have been
devolved to them. Countries emerging from conflict
and protracted civil war may not be in a position to
rapidly devolve services to local governments.
Equitable service delivery outcomes are unlikely to
come about when power is deeply contested and
powerful social groups control resources and
dominate local politics, since these are precisely the
conditions that give rise to élite capture in
decentralised service delivery. Efforts to decentralise
service delivery in such environments are likely to fail,
especially if they result from hasty and poorly
designed interventions that are intended to generate
rapid results in the form of improved equity and
efficiency.
More stable political contexts accompanied by steady
economic growth and with relatively capable local
governments offer a more conducive environment
for the devolution of power and resources which in
turn are indispensable requirements for successful
decentralisation of service delivery. Devolution of
responsibility for service provision without
strengthening local state capacity to produce or to
coordinate delivery by non-state actors at the local
level produces inefficient and negative outcomes.
Inadequate resourcing of services through restricted
fiscal transfers to local authorities from central
governments and commensurate local tax-raising
powers limits the scope and capacity to generate
sufficient funds for adequate levels of service
provision. Delegation of responsibility to non-state
and private sector providers can make up for some of
the shortfall in provision but this is not a substitute
for enhanced local state capacity and adequate levels
of resources. Political commitment, effective
channels of accountability and effective oversight of
service provisioning by local non-state actors are all
recognised to be essential ingredients for efficient
and equitable provision. Finally, even though
concepts of devolution and local governance have a
long pedigree, democratic decentralisation is still a
relatively new phenomenon in most less-developed
countries and positive results will take a long time to
mature. As with other types of governance reforms,
short-term and time-bound interventions will not
bring about the desired improvements in service
delivery outcomes. Steady, incremental and well-
resourced initiatives that build capacity and increase
accountability are the surest route to realising the
promise of democratic decentralisation.
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